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PREFACE 
 Tuesday, December 23, 1980, presented as a crisp, clear day with ample sunshine. 
Two young Emergency Medical Technicians sat in a temporary medical facility on a 
major construction site in southern Kentucky. At approximately 9:20 AM a frantic voice 
echoed across the portable radio stating, “Man down at the power plant.” As the 
technicians hurriedly grabbed for trauma kits and hardhats, a follow-up question came 
through: How bad? The one-word response caused a collective pause: fatal. 
 A 63-year-old worker, along with his great nephew and another younger worker, 
had traveled to the site to install specially fabricated colored metal panels around the 
upper portion of the power plant building. The leader stood on a swinging scaffold 40 
feet above the ground; the others would hand the roughly four foot square panels over the 
edge of the roof and help place them to be fastened.  
 Based on reports from witnesses, a gust of wind caused the elder worker to lose 
his balance and fall backwards from the scaffold to the ground. Despite a timely response 
and rapid transport, the individual expired at approximately 10:25 AM. The trio of 
workers had planned to leave the site at 10:30 AM to return home to Mississippi for the 
Christmas holiday.   
 At the time of the accident, the worker wore a fall prevention belt but did not have 
the end secured to the building or scaffold. While the medical personnel attended to the 
worker, the site safety director looked on and made a statement that ultimately changed 
the life and world view of at least one of those present: “I saw him not tied off yesterday; 
I guess I should have said something.” 
 At the time of this incident, the site safety director held the sole responsibility for 
enforcing safety rules among contractors. He had placed himself in the key leadership 
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role for safety.  Had he chosen to address the issue the previous day, the incident might 
well have not happened. Had a culture of compliance existed, the expectation may well 
have led to a safer mindset among the affected worker and others across the project. 
 Out of this example of poor safety leadership emerged at least one advocate who 
remains true to a self-commitment made that morning, to never fail to confront such 
issues when observed. It is my hope that this research and dissertation helps to further 
those efforts.   
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 The purpose of this study was to explore the correlation between employee 
perceptions of their supervisor’s commitment to safety (safety climate) and the actual rate 
of occupational injuries among the same employees. The study also aimed to examine the 
relationship between the employee perceptions of their supervisor’s leadership practices 
and the supervisor’s safety climate rating. In addition, this study examined the potential 
influence of employee demographic factors on their responses to survey questions. 
 This research study sought to answer three primary questions: (1) Does a 
significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of his supervisor’s 
commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual injury/illness rates within an 
organization? (2) Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership 
practices of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?  
(3) Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and leadership 
practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic variables including gender, 
education level, skilled versus non-skilled positions, time in position, or shift assignment?   
 Previous studies of similar construct focused on industrial settings such as 
manufacturing, construction, and oil and gas exploration. This study focused on workers 
engaged in maintenance type functions within the non-industrial setting of a university. 
The construct and findings of this study has applicability in a variety of settings including 
healthcare, general business, etc. Developing an understanding of the role that 
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supervisors play in actively driving safety programs that affect their subordinates 
provides valuable insight into elements of supervisor selection and training. 
 A survey instrument was developed utilizing a combination of previously 
validated “safety climate” questions, along with selected general leadership questions. A 
7- point Likert scale was employed for the safety climate and leadership practices 
questions. Demographic questions were included to provide critical data for application 
for research question three. In addition, three questions were included to solicit data 
regarding each respondent’s injury experience for the previous 12 month period. 
 The findings of this study, while in several instances not yielding statistically 
significant data, support several key assertions that appear to have relevancy in the study 
and practice of the critical importance of leadership in providing a safe workplace. A 
strong correlation emerged between participant responses to safety climate and general 
leadership actions questions, demonstrating the interrelationship of leadership to safety. 
In addition, the findings indicated that demographic factors including gender, education 
level, length of service, and assigned work shift had negligible effect on employee views 
of their leaders.  
 The results of this study provide useful information regarding the influence of 
supervisor’s actions upon the safety performance of their employees. In addition, the 
study helps validate the relationship of general leadership practices of supervisors to the 
overall safety climate of their work groups. While additional research into the concept 
and practical application of safety climate as a predictor of safety performance should be 
undertaken, the findings of this study add to collective knowledge of the subject. 
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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION 
  In 2011, 4600 active workers in the United States died as a result of occupational 
injuries and illnesses. Another 1.18 million received injuries that resulted in their absence  
from work at least one day, with the average number of days lost per individual being 
eight (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). These statistics do not represent an anomaly; 
conversely, the numbers represent an average year in the world of work in the U.S. 
 In strictly business terms, the National Safety Council estimated that on average, 
an occupational fatality occurring in the U.S. results in an economic loss of $1.39 million. 
Non-fatal serious occupational injuries resulted in an average cost of $54,000. By 
applying these estimates, one can view the potential financial impact of occupational 
fatalities alone in 2011 approached $6.394 billion, while serious non-fatal injuries 
accounted for $63.72 billion (National Safety Council, 2012). The estimated impact of 
these events in monetary terms, while substantial by most reasonable standards, remains 
little more than a fleeting thought to most business and public service leaders, until of 
course an incident strikes one of their employees or affects a friend or family member.  
Background 
  Many accidents result either directly or indirectly from the carelessness of 
employees.  An injury can directly occur when an employee purposely bypasses a 
machine guard and is injured by a moving component.  Employees also incur injuries 
from indirect actions such as one employee removing and failing to replace a guard, 
resulting in a second employee contacting a hazard. 
 Developing concrete methods for controlling the human element in relation to 
occupational injuries remains somewhat an enigma.  No clear consensus exists regarding 
where the lines of demarcation for ownership of safety should lie between the employer 
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and the worker.  Most leaders of U.S. organized labor and many government officials 
have long taken the position that the employers assume the total burden for the safety of 
workers, and individual workers should assume no fault or responsibility for their actions 
relative to their own safety or the safety of their coworkers (Hammer, 1981).  
 The regulatory view relative to responsibility for safety in U.S. organizations, 
under the purview of the federal or state Occupational Safety and Health programs, 
resides in the Code of Federal Register 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Act: SEC. 
5. Duties:  
  (a) Each employer -- 
   (1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment 
 which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
 death  or serious physical harm to his employees; 
 (2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated 
 under  this Act. 
  29 USC 654  
 (b) Each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health standards 
 and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this Act which are 
 applicable to his own actions and conduct. (U.S. Department of Labor, 1970) 
  Although management under the law has the ultimate responsibility for providing 
a safe and healthy workplace, the employee also has a duty to “comply” with all 
applicable safety rules and standards (U.S. Department of Labor, 1970). This divergent 
perspective regarding accountability for safety, particularly in unionized workplaces, 
many times results in a stalemate of sorts where real issues and hazards exist unchecked 
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whether mechanical, physical, or human, resulting in lingering hazards and repeated 
occurrences of injuries.  
  While an argument exists for both sides of this issue, a more relevant question 
surfaces amid the fray: How do some heavily unionized companies maintain world-class 
levels of safety performance?  The answer may reside in examples such as Alcoa 
Corporation, E.I. DuPont, and General Motors Company L.L.C. 
 Krause (2001) discussed the influence of Paul O’Neill, who became CEO of 
Alcoa in 1987. He would later become Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. 
When O’Neill took over the company, he faced many challenges ranging from labor 
issues to low shareholder returns on investments. 
 Krause (2001) contended that O’Neill turned around Alcoa by establishing a 
climate where employees were viewed as the strength of the company. Safety and 
accident prevention become a top priority across the entire company. Alcoa distinguished 
itself from other companies by setting a visible goal of “zero” injuries. More important, 
O’Neill held his executives personally accountable for the accidents that occurred in their 
respective facilities. Ultimately, the accountability factor applied to the welfare of 
employees brought the United Steel Workers Union to the party as a true joint partner in 
the company safety efforts.  
 O’Neill brought a similar influence to General Motors when he assumed a 
position on the board of directors in 1983. Near the end of his first meeting, O’Neill 
asked a key question: “Where’s the safety report?”  This seemingly simple question 
proved to be a pivotal moment because the implications appeared obvious to top leaders. 
They honestly did not know the status of employee safety within their own company. 
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 The actions that the Chairman, CEO, and President of GM took in response 
turned a tense moment of uncertainty into a path to leadership that included a lasting 
partnership with the United Auto Workers and a position as the leader in safety 
performance of all automotive companies both U.S. and foreign (Simon & Frazee, 2005). 
 The E. I. DuPont Corporation stands as another example of strong organizational 
leadership of safety. Former President Thomas Jefferson encouraged E.I. DuPont to 
establish a gunpowder manufacturing operation in the United States. DuPont apprenticed 
under the Chief of the Royal Powder Works in France before moving to America (Klein, 
2009). 
 DuPont established his powder works in Delaware in 1803, and from the 
beginning established a unique approach to safety that remains a cornerstone of 
operations for DuPont Corporation today. DuPont understood from experience the 
inherent dangers involved in making, storing, and shipping gunpowder. He recognized 
that the responsibility for safety had to reside with every person in the organization from 
the newest employee to himself as the owner (Klein, 2009). 
 To support his interest in displaying the importance of safety, DuPont took a very 
unique approach in building his family home in the center of the powder works. This 
move served to enhance his responsiveness and oversight of the operation and also to 
serve as a sign to his workers that by and large the plant was a safe place to work and also 
to live. These two examples provide evidence that positive leadership actions focused on 
the safety of employees can affect significant, lasting change in the largest of 
organizations, even with the added complexity of a union environment as in the cases of 
Alcoa and General Motors (Klein, 2009).  
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 In order to better protect their workers from the risks they face every day, 
organizational leaders must understand the critical importance of establishing a strong 
institutional focus on safety. The power to foster a positive organizational safety culture 
and climate resides not with the safety professional; the responsibility lands squarely on 
the shoulders of the management team from the top down to the first line supervisor. 
Establishing a positive safety climate most assuredly helps nurture an environment where 
people value the opportunity to recognize potential hazards and work together to 
collectively identify means and methods to accomplish the tasks at hand with the least 
amount of risk possible.  
Understanding the Problem 
 The realization that, on average, 12 workers in the U.S. leave home each day and 
do not return as a result of occupational fatalities causes reflection on the part of many, 
particularly those individuals tasked with implementing programs and policies focused on 
protecting workers. Leaders must begin to understand how so many workers sustain 
injuries in a country with copious safety and labor laws along with cutting edge safety 
technologies (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013).  Exploring the causal factors involved in 
the majority of occupational fatalities lends one to conclude that the answer resides not in 
the laws or machinery, but within the workers, managers, and ultimately senior leaders 
themselves. 
  Machine guards and safety hazard warning signs do not prevent a worker from 
injury if they remove or otherwise bypass a machine guard or ignore posted warnings. A 
comprehensive safety system must strive for higher level safeguard that constantly 
separates workers from potential hazards, regardless of human actions or inactions. 
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 Deming (1986) contended that management directly controls 94 % of all quality 
problems within a typical organization. Deming further insisted that quality defects 
within a production system can be prevented if management assumes responsibility and 
then unites, trains, and empowers all employees toward a “constancy of purpose” focused 
on “continuous improvement.”  Deming’s 14 Obligations of Management readily apply 
to the area of safety, specifically to the concept of an integrated safety system. Salazar 
(2006) relate the similarities present between quality and safety within an organization. 
Management must assume responsibility for preventing injuries within their respective 
“span of control.” Leveraging sound leadership practices, organizational leaders must 
involve their subordinates utilizing a combination of training and active engagement.  
 Modern safety management theories, including “Behavior Based Safety,” focus 
on the need to engage the employees and leaders and continually redirect their attention 
to safety. Many organizations attempt to drive safe behaviors through extensive training, 
worker team empowerment, or employee safety incentive programs, all of which have 
found their place in the quest for safer workplaces. Individually these initiatives will have 
some positive effect on the safety of a workplace, but in most cases the impact of any one 
alone proves relatively short lived, and ultimately the organization’s injury rate 
improvements reach a plateau or increase. To sustain a positive behavior-based safety 
program, leaders must engage personnel at all levels of the organization to consistently 
practice safety (Geller, 2001). 
 Ansari and Modarress (1997) provided examples of several major American 
corporations that have demonstrated sustained safety improvement. The companies 
included: DuPont, Allied Signal, Proctor and Gamble, 3M, General Electric, IBM, 
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Boeing, and Kaiser Aluminum. They further identified executive leadership as a primary 
driver of successful safety programs:  “...most business executives now share the 
realization that the foremost factor in becoming a world-class safety performer is strong 
commitment and meaningful leadership by top management. Creating world-class safety 
performance requires unquestioned commitment by the executive leadership towards 
safety” (p. 391). 
 The key difference between these successful entities and others with less 
successful safety programs resides in their leadership structure and programs. These 
organizations have a fundamental understanding that no program will work consistently 
without positive leadership at all levels. While top executive support for safety is critical 
to set the tone for the organization, all leaders down to the first-line supervisor be 
committed to safety and demonstrate this commitment on a continual basis (Ansari & 
Modarress, 1997).  
 The premise that the first-line supervisor holds a critical importance as the 
primary interface with workers serves as the basis for the construct of this research. In 
essence the perceptions held by the average worker toward a supervisor with regard to the 
supervisor’s safety leadership acumen and actions may serve as the best barometer of the 
overall environment of safety within the organization as a whole. It stands to reason that 
the supervisor must demonstrate a clear commitment to worker safety through 
communication and other actions to positively influence worker perceptions (Krause, 
2008). 
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Worker Safety in Non-Industrial Environments 
 The preponderance of safety regulations along with safety related research and 
literature focus on safety in manufacturing and other industrial environments, due 
primarily to the fact that these settings contain more workers engaged in activities that 
involve hazardous equipment or processes. This higher level of potential risk and 
exposure of workers to hazards has historically produced higher injury rates among these 
workers. 
 While settings such as educational institutions, healthcare facilities, and other 
non-industrial settings may not garner the same level of attention regarding injury 
potential, within the operations of these entities employees engage in regular work 
activities including facilities maintenance, housekeeping, construction, lawn and grounds 
maintenance, etc. The workers assigned to these activities, though smaller in overall 
numbers when compared to those in industrial settings, face similar hazards based upon 
the tasks assigned. A concern resides in the potential for leaders at universities and other 
non-industrial entities to underestimate the risks that workers in their maintenance and 
support functions face, due to an overall perception that general conditions within their 
operations pose limited risk. 
Theoretical Framework 
 This study will focus on the validity of safety climate measures as a predictor of 
injury frequency within a given organization. While this work will utilize a similar 
construct to previous endeavors, it will be seminal with regard to the focus on a non-
industrial setting. 
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 Chapter II will provide insights into the impact of organizational culture and 
climate safety in general terms, with a focus on the more specific sub-set of safety 
climate, relative to the overall safety performance of an organization. The body of prior 
related research will provide the foundation, framework, and rationale for the 
development of the overall research construct. 
Research Questions 
 The proposed research will attempt to determine if a correlation exists between an 
employee’s perceptions of the supervisor’s commitment to the safety of workers in their 
charge and the actual occurrence of injuries within the surveyed group.  
 The research design consists of a paper survey that will be distributed and 
collected during regularly scheduled employee staff meetings. A member of the 
Environmental Health and Safety staff will hand out the survey.  
 Three primary research questions form the foundation of this research: 
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of his      
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual      
injury/illness rates within an organization? 
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices 
of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their 
employees?  
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and 
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic 
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled 
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?   
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Rationale and Significance of This Study 
 While research exists related to both supervisors’ leadership actions and safety 
climate and the respective effects on organizational safety, the focus to date has included 
primarily manufacturing, construction, heavy industry, and oil and gas exploration. At the 
time of this writing no studies emerged that explored the concept of safety climate or the 
application of safety climate measures in a non-industrial setting. 
 This study will contribute to the existing body of research related to safety climate 
in general and, more specifically, the applicability of safety climate measures as an 
indicator of organizational safety performance in the form of occupational injuries and 
illnesses. The inclusion of an assessment of employee observations of general leadership 
actions will provide a substantive cross-reference to the potential impact of leadership on 
safety climate within the groups surveyed.  
Nature of Study 
 The survey tool used in this study includes general demographic questions related 
to length of employment, assigned shift, gender, education level, job type, and experience 
level of the participant’s supervisor. Nine questions related to safety climate make up the 
core of the instrument. These questions have emerged from a variety of studies based on 
a seminal research project, as detailed in Zohar (1980).  Eleven questions related to 
general leadership observations were added to the instrument to bolster the overall 
validity of the findings.  
 Finally, three specific questions related to the injury history of the participants 
were included to solicit data aimed at drawing a comparison of the individual participants  
assessment of supervisor focus on safety, or safety climate, with their personal history of 
injuries within the preceding 12 months. 
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Limitations of Study 
 The study will focus on one staff department at a single regional comprehensive 
university. The subject department performs a variety of functions including general 
maintenance, housekeeping, and grounds maintenance. The selection of a staff 
department opposed to an academic functional area will make the findings of the study 
more applicable to other non-manufacturing settings with similar staff support functions. 
The findings of the study have limits due to a potential lack of geographic, cultural, 
ethnic, and/or gender diversity that may exist within the organization sampled.  
Definitions 
 Occupational safety and related areas tend to use a variety of specific 
terminology. The following section includes definitions in an effort to provide clarity of 
meaning of selected terms as utilized in this work: 
 Behavior Based Safety - concept of safety management that focuses on the actions 
of people and methods to modify the behaviors that are deemed to result in employee 
injuries or that allow unsafe-conditions to exist within an organization (Geller, 2001). 
 Disabling Injury - injury that results in an employee being unable to perform the 
normal job functions resulting in modified job assignments and/or lost work days 
(Industrial Accident Prevention Association, 2007). 
 OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration is a division of the U.S. 
Department of Labor that was established with the passage of the Williams-Steiger Act in 
1970. The legislation, also known as the OSH Act, established a greater regulatory role 
for the federal and state governments in assuring that employers provided a workplace 
free of recognized hazards (Walter, 2011). 
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 Occupational Fatality - death of a worker that occurs while performing normal 
job functions or arises out of exposure to a hazard that occurs while engaged in normal 
work activities (U.S. Department of Labor, 2001). 
 Occupational Injury or Illness - injury or occupational related illness that occurs 
while performing normal job functions or arises out of exposure to a hazard that occurs 
while engaged in normal work activities (U.S. Department of Labor, 2001). 
 Organizational Safety Culture - “The product of the individual and group values, 
attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and 
the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programs” (Mansdorf, 
1999  p. 1). 
 Safety Climate - Zohar (1980) provided a view of safety climate as  “…a 
summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work environments” (p. 
96). 
Summary 
 Many leaders struggle with how to improve the safety of their organizations and 
better protect their employees. While many programs and practices for safety 
management exist, their overall effectiveness remains bound to the ability of the 
organization’s leadership team to effectively implement and maintain a level of 
continuous improvement. Leaders must accurately assess and interpret the state of safety 
within their organizations. Providing leaders with effective tools to help unravel the 
layers of complexity associated with organizational dynamics, particularly in a specific 
area such as employee safety, is essential to furthering efforts at injury prevention. 
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 Utilizing survey instruments to assess safety climate has been proven to serve as a 
valid predictive indicator of employees’ perceptions of an organization’s overall focus on 
safety (Zohar, 1980).  Research in this subject area to date has remained focused 
primarily on manufacturing and other industrial settings. Expanding the body of existing 
safety climate research into additional categories of organizations can provide valuable 
supportive data regarding the versatility of such measures as an indicator of effective 
safety leadership.     
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CHAPTER II : REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
  This chapter will provide supportive data relative to the topic of safety climate as 
a predictive indicator of the potential for occupational injuries in a given workgroup. 
Safety climate, as defined in the seminal work of Zohar (1980), focuses on the 
perceptions of employees in a workgroup regarding their supervisors’ focus on their 
safety. 
 Simard and Marchand (1995) provided insight into the concept that workers 
perceptions of the relative safety within their workgroups is influenced by a variety of 
multilevel factors, including the actions and reactions of their first-line supervisor, along 
with the perceived commitment of senior leadership toward safety.  Their findings 
indicated a direct correlation between the level of effectiveness of the supervisor and 
senior leaders in promoting a work environment focused on safety of workers within their 
workgroups and the level of satisfaction the workers felt toward their safety. Griffin and 
Neal (2000) reported similar findings in a study of Australian manufacturing and mining 
facilities, noting that safety resides as a “higher order factor” (p. 347) that affects the 
overall worker perception of the work environment. In addition, the study noted a strong 
relationship between safety climate and worker compliance with safety rules and 
participation in safety related activities across the organizations studied.    
Theoretical Framework 
 The theoretical framework for this literature review centers on first exploring the 
history of occupational safety from the late 1800s to the present in order to provide a 
panoramic view of events that have helped shape worker safety in the present day. 
Second, the review chronicles the general concepts and selected research regarding the 
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topics of organizational culture and climate in general. The third segment of the review 
will delve into the more specific and primary focus area of safety climate and provide 
insight into its construct, measurement, and practical implications for organizations. 
 The 1980 study by Zohar serves as the starting point for research related to the 
assessment of safety climate and for utilizing the resulting data as a predictive indicator 
of occupational injury proclivity within specific organizations. While the selected studies 
differ somewhat in setting, survey instrument, or approach, they share a common thread, 
in that they focus on the concept that organizational leaders have the greatest potential to 
influence the safety climate of an organization. 
The Evolution of Safety in the U.S. – Lessons in Leadership 
 When the Railway Safety Act was being considered in 1893, a railroad 
 executive said that it would cost less to bury a man killed in an accident than to 
 put air brakes on a car. This railroad executive probably was not a malicious man. 
 In all probability he believed in God, was a good husband and loving father, and 
 patted his dog when he came home. He would have done anything to avoid injury 
 to his family or dog, but the safety of other individuals was considered only in 
 monetary terms. (Hammer, 1981, p.1)   
Such a statement today would most likely bring rapid and staunch rebuke; however, at 
the time the statement received little attention based on the norms of business. 
 While broad-based standardized governmental records of occupational injuries 
did not commence in the U.S. until 1970, some examples exist of injury data focused on 
specific industries, such as mining and railroads, as early as the 1800s. References to 
comparative data regarding fatalities between similar industries in the U.S. and countries 
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such as Great Britain appear as early as 1890, as noted by Aldrich (2010). In the period of 
1890-1905, American mines had fatality rates between 2.52 and 3.53 per thousand 
workers, depending on the type of coal being mined. The reports further indicate that, 
during the same period, British mines posted fatality rates between 1.28 and 1.61 per 
thousand employees.   
 An interesting point exists, in that the U.S. fatality rates increased from 2.52 in the 
period of 1890-1894 to 3.53 during 1900-1905, while the British rates decreased from 
1.61 to 1.28 per thousand during the same periods. One would ask, Why the variance 
between the U.S. and Great Britain?  Fundamental differences existed in the nature of 
mining in the U.S. and Great Britain during this period; chiefly coal in Great Britain 
resided much deeper in the earth than most U.S. coal. This logistical fact resulted in the 
British mines being more costly and difficult to establish; these issues led the British 
mining companies to invest more in mine structures and to conduct mining operations in 
a more patient manner in order to extract the most coal from each mine. This combination 
of monetary investment and slower timeline resulted in a safer working environment 
(Aldrich, 2010). 
 Conversely, the typical U.S. veins of coal formed much closer to the surface and 
existed in many different areas of the country. These facts led many U.S. mining 
companies to operate in a much less methodical manner, using less expensive methods to 
shore the mine walls and roofs and more explosives to extract the most coal in the 
shortest time period. These conditions and methods, coupled with practices such as pay 
based on the amount of coal extracted versus an hourly rate, made the U.S. operations 
substantially less safe than those in Britain (Aldrich, 2010). 
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 Aldrich (2010) noted similar disparity in fatality rates between British and U.S. 
railroad workers during the same time period. Rates among U.S. railroaders were almost 
twice those of their British counterparts. The greatest influencing factor that accounted 
for the higher rates on the U.S. railroad related to the investment in installing safety 
equipment such as automatic couplers and air braking systems. In short, the British 
simply put more money toward safer trains and safer work practices than did their 
counterparts at U.S. railroads.  
 Many other examples throughout the 20th century reflect apparent callousness 
toward the welfare of workers by business leaders. These actions appear as a primary 
factor leading to the rise of the labor movement in the United States. Reynolds (1989) 
discussed the impact of the election of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932.  The 
country remained in the Great Depression. Roosevelt negotiated the passage of The 
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which eased many restrictions on corporations 
regarding anti-trust issues such as setting standard wages and prices in a collaborative 
manner.  
 Citing concerns of safety in the workplaces along with other poor working 
conditions, the Act also included a trade-off for labor leaders in sections 7A that 
guaranteed workers the right to form unions with leaders of their choosing. The initial 
reactions from leaders, such as Alford Sloan at General Motors, included the 
establishment of internal employee committees to review issues such as working 
conditions. Sloan and other industrial leaders did not attempt to disguise the purpose of 
these committees. They maintained focus on the need to address employee concerns and 
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ultimately deny the union’s key issues on which to rally workers and establish a power 
base.  
 The committees succeeded with regard to general working conditions. However, 
the financial issues proved too much and ultimately led to a rise in membership across 
most unions, including the United Auto Workers. While the safety of workers remained a 
structural component of the overreaching topic of working conditions, ironically, safety 
did not appear as a primary bargaining issue in the early days of modern U.S. unionism. 
 Following contentious and lengthy strikes against General Motors in the late 
1930s, the UAW established a wide-reaching agreement that secured its place as the sole 
employee representative body for almost all GM facilities. Safety emerged as a pivotal 
issue in later agreements. It became one of a sacred few issues for which the union could 
call a strike. These actions elevated worker safety by making it a critical trump card for 
the union as leverage for all manner of negotiations (Reynolds, 1989). 
 Evidence of understanding of the impact of occupational injuries and illnesses 
appeared in descriptions by Tolman and Kendall (1913):  
 It is the general opinion of the engineering profession that one-half the accidents 
 in the United States are preventable, and that a conservative estimate of the annual 
 number of accidents which result fatally or in partial or total incapacity on the part 
 of the worker may be placed at 500,000. (p. 2) 
 Early prevention efforts by companies included widespread use of personal 
protective equipment such as footwear, safety glasses, and outer garments, all barriers 
aimed to shield workers from physical hazards in the environment.  Companies also 
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began to explore methods of protecting workers from moving machinery and equipment 
through machine guards and physical barriers (Rittenberry, 2007).  
 A distinct evolution of safety theory and practice appeared with the passage of 
early workers’ compensation laws and a transformation of the legal system; companies 
assumed more accountability for financial support of injured workers. As a result of the 
increased economic impact, companies began to explore ways to improve worker safety, 
primarily based on financial reasons. Additional influences included the creation of 
organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in 1896 and the 
National Safety Council (NSC) in 1913. These non-profit organizations brought together 
key groups, including academics and business leaders to develop standards and 
operational guidelines and best practices to make workplaces safer (Aldrich, 2010). 
 The U.S. Department of Labor, established in 1913, began to look at a variety of 
issues related to U.S. workplaces. Their primary focus for most of the 20th century 
included wages, working hours, child labor, workers compensation, etc. The passage of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1971 served as a milestone, putting forth 
national standards for safety in the workplace (Board on Health Sciences Policy, 2013). 
 Most significant regulatory efforts came as a result of major incidents that drew 
attention to unsafe conditions or practices. No incident proved more pivotal than the 
Triangle Shirtwaist Fire of 1911. The factory location in New York City made the 
Saturday afternoon incident a spectacle for the public and news media alike. In addition, 
the majority of the victims were young women, portrayed as helpless pawns in the 
various news accounts. This fact alone helped fuel public outrage. Another element 
involved the number of victims that jumped to their death from the ninth and tenth floors 
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of the factory. When graphic photos of victims in the air or on the sidewalks where they 
landed appeared in major newspapers and magazines, a morbid anger arose followed 
closely by calls for new laws and regulations (Cornell University, 2011).  
 The investigation found numerous fire and life safety issues, some considered 
violations of existing fire codes, others that codes had not yet been established to cover. 
In the aftermath of the Triangle fire, the city, State of New York, and even national 
standards-making organizations such as NFPA enacted code revisions to address fire 
escapes, fire doors, stairwell enclosures, and building fire sprinklers among others. 
Ultimately, the high loss of life in the Triangle Fire could have been mitigated if the 
supervisors/managers of the operations had not locked the fire exits and reconfigured the 
exits left open to allow only one person at a time to move through them. The managers 
took each of these actions to assure that no worker left the work area without permission 
and that workers could be closely scrutinized as they exited to prevent theft of cloth or 
clothing (Cornell University, 2011). 
Key Factors Affecting U.S. Safety Performance 
 Many individuals, groups, movements, innovations, and significant historical 
events receive credit for improving the overall safety of workers today. The more notable 
groups include the onset of formal collective bargaining of unions, the establishment of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and innovations in safe design of 
machinery and equipment (Manuele, 1997).  
 Reynolds (1989) documented several key factors related to the various unions’ 
influence on health and safety, beginning in the 1930s. Union leaders such as Walter 
Ruether, head of the United Auto Workers, made very aggressive stands against Ford and 
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General Motors. Both companies fought the concept of union organization, viewing 
unions as an outside influence that would disrupt their operations and negatively impact 
their companies, and leveraged their political capital to enlist police and even the 
National Guard to fight the union organizers.  
 West (1986) provided examples of the primary factors that combined to help drive 
the successful organization of General Motors Workers in Flint, Michigan, and led to a 
pivotal point in modern union history, the sit-down strike of 1936-37. There appeared 
several issues that topped the workers’ lists of grievances including wages, production 
rates, work rules, general working conditions, and worker safety. While some politicians 
appeared sympathetic to the concept of unions, they could not support the efforts of the 
unions based upon wage issues alone because the workers at Ford and General Motors 
were paid better than those at most other companies. Safety and working conditions 
became the cornerstone of union organizers and the primary source of leverage in the 
form of a basis for the threat of strikes. The threat of work stoppage based on working 
conditions in turn forced companies to negotiate on all fronts including wages.  
 Miller (1984) provided insight into the continued influence of unions on safety, 
particularly their focus on supporting the efforts of OSHA and other governmental 
entities in developing new technology approaches to worker protections. The perception 
that unions push employers to provide improved safety for their members remains a 
critical tool for both organizing additional union members and for maintaining support 
for unions with politicians that see union members as a key group of voters. 
 OSHA itself stands as one of the greatest influences on U.S. worker safety, as 
reported by Bartel and Thomas (1985).  The study focused on direct and indirect effects 
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of OSHA regulations on safety. While the findings of this particular study indicated no 
direct correlation between the establishment of OSHA and reductions in injury rates 
among the organizations studied, the research revealed substantial indirect impacts on the 
evolution of safety systems and safety compliance. OSHA activities have resulted in 
company leaders and workers gaining increased knowledge of potential hazards and 
related options for controlling them. This indirect effect has impacted the overall severity 
of injuries and a company’s ability to proactively identify the most serious threats to 
workers prior to occurrence. Ultimately, the term OSHA has become synonymous with 
worker safety and safety compliance. These influencing factors have combined to 
improve the overall safety of work environments and have helped facilitate a steady 
decrease in occupational fatalities and serious injuries. (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008).  
 Another key factor that has greatly influenced safety in the workplace resides in 
the advancement of technologies related to safe design of equipment and processes. Prior 
to the application of a variety of engineering control principles aimed at safeguarding the 
worker and improving productivity, machines were built to perform the tasks intended 
and the safety of the worker addressed after installation through manual machine 
guarding and personal protective equipment. The application of hazard control 
technologies such as automatic equipment shutdown devices triggered when a worker 
enters a potential danger zone of a piece of equipment, make the manufacture of the 
equipment more cost effective, while also improving worker safety (Manuele, 1997). 
 The roles of unions, OSHA, and innovative technologies on workplace safety 
have been substantial. A very strong inner-relationship exists between each of the three 
factors. Unions played a major role in the establishment of OSHA and continue to have a 
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great influence on safety standards development and enforcement strategies within the 
agency. The need to find a balance between compliance with OSHA standards and the 
ability to operate industrial machinery and equipment in a cost effective manner have 
driven the evolution of advanced safety related technologies (Fadier & Garza, 2006).  
Organizational Culture 
 Argyris (1955) first documented the concept that an organization consists as an 
“aggregate of parts” that come together to form the “organized whole” (p. 2). In basic 
terms, the people within the organization, both leaders and employees alike, bring their 
collective personalities, life experiences, and worldviews with them every day.  
 Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macey (2013) provided a general description of 
organization culture as: “shared basic assumptions, values and beliefs” (p. 362). They 
further noted that these elements of culture “characterize the setting” and are perpetuated 
to new members of the organization through communication of “myths and stories” (p. 
362).   
 Rousseau (1990) provided a view of culture as a process within the organization 
where individuals share their respective values, beliefs, and norms. Some members 
readily share their perspectives, while others quietly process the inputs of the day. Each 
individual way, whether covert or overt, adds input to the collective culture through 
words and actions. While leaders may have a greater level of influence due to their 
positions, one should not discount the power of the lowest level member of the 
organization to influence the overall culture. Organizations by nature have unique 
complexities derived from the vast divergence of individual personalities, styles, and 
traits. These elements merge into a dynamic structure that forms the culture of the 
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organization. The shaping of this structure through leadership practices determines the 
ultimate culture of a given organization.  
 Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo (1996) provided several critical observations 
concerning organizational culture. Their works focused on the concept that the collective 
beliefs and values of the members of an organization yield the ultimate culture of that 
organization. 
They further surmised that organizational culture results from “firmly implanted beliefs 
and values” (p. 5) within the members of a group. 
 Marcoulides and Heck (1993) developed a research model that defined six core 
elements within the overall construct of organizational culture. These elements include 
organizational structure, organizational values, task organization, organizational climate, 
employee attitudes, and organizational performance. Understanding the components that 
form the overall culture of an organization provides an opportunity for researchers to 
dissect the larger construct into separate structural elements. This micro view aids in 
understanding the implications of culture on specific operational areas of a specific 
organization. 
Organizational Climate 
 Litwin and Stringer (1968) described organizational climate as measureable 
properties within the working environment that appear as indirect and direct paths to the 
members of the organization and influence individual behaviors. The authors further 
contended that organizational climate results from the sum of individual perceptions of 
those working in an organization. Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macey (2013) concluded that 
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organizational climate relates directly to employees and their perceptions of the work 
environment.  
Organizational climate results from individual beliefs and stems from employees’ 
interpretations of the assumptions, philosophies and values that comprise the cultural 
norms within an organization (Brown & Brooks, 2002). Sowpow (2006) proposed that 
organizational climate arises from organizational culture and can provide insight into the 
current state of the organization. Organizational climate relates to the environment that 
affects the behavior of the employees. It deals with the way(s) employees make sense out 
of their environment (Reichers & Schneider, 1990). 
 Taking a more micro view of organizational culture and climate focused 
specifically on the area of employee safety provides the basis for this study. In order to 
affect change within an organization, one must understand the present-day dynamics that 
reside within the group. Exploring the specific concept of safety climate requires a 
foundation provided through a review of prior research.  Understanding the elements of 
safety climate and the opportunities to quantify and document it for a specific 
organization will provide a roadmap for this research. 
The Concept of Safety Climate 
 Zohar (1980) first detailed the concept of organizational climate specifically 
focused on employee safety. His study focused on a number of manufacturing facilities in 
Israel, and he found a positive relationship between facilities having robust safety 
programs and lower incidents of accidents. From this seminal work, the specific term 
“safety climate” found a lasting place in the lexicon of academic studies regarding 
leadership of safety in organizations. Zohar further surmised that an organization’s 
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leaders’ commitment to the safety of the employees in their charge “is a major factor 
affecting the success of safety programs in industry” (p. 10). 
 Further references to safety culture and climate provide evidence of the 
importance of a leader’s actions relative to making safety a priority within the 
organization. The fundamental premise relates to the specific organizational emphasis 
that exists regarding the expectations for employees to perform tasks in a safe manner. 
These expectations play a critical part in how employees view the safety climate of their 
workplace (Zohar, 2000).  
 Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) noted that safety climate has a direct correlation to  
safe or unsafe behaviors in employees. Krause (2008) concluded that management at its 
basic level includes motivation, coordination, and providing direction to employees to 
accomplish established objectives. How supervisors interject safety into these 
management elements has a direct effect on the safety climate of the organization. 
 Safety climate involves a collective of factors. These include management values, 
organizational practices, organizational communications, and employee engagement in 
safety (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000).  Leaders need to understand that each of these factors 
must exist in a positive way to support a perception of safety in the view of the employee 
in order to establish and maintain a positive safety climate.   
 The key to the application of safety climate as a tool for leaders resides in their 
ability to measure the safety climate within an organization and then utilize the data to 
develop a useful snapshot of the organization. At least five studies have purported a 
predictive application between safety climate and future safety performance within an 
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organization (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002; 
Hoffman & Mark 2006; Hofman & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000). 
The Relationship between Leadership and Safety Climate 
 Ultimately, the positives of good leadership and the negatives of poor leadership 
have received ample attention in the literature.  Great leaders have resurrected 
downtrodden businesses and countries; and at times, one can argue the world itself, in the 
case of World War II. Most of the great leadership moments in history emerged from the 
poor leadership that preceded them. 
 Kozlowksi and Doherty (1989) noted that early theorists (Blake & Mouton, 1964; 
Indik, 1968; Lewin, 1951; Likert, 1967; Litwin & Stringer, 1968; McGregor, 1960) 
regarded leadership as an important organizational factor that affected employees’ 
perceptions of climate. Momeni (2009) concluded that a leader’s behavior has a great 
influence on employee attitudes, behaviors, emotions, morale, and perceptions. Thus, an 
examination of the literature suggests that a leader’s behavior can potentially result in the 
creation and continual survival of a positive, thriving organizational climate in a non-
profit organization. 
  Leaders define the key operating principles of their organizations, including not 
only the formal business practices, policies, and procedures, but also the informal 
operating culture and climate of their organizations. The climate elements that influence 
their organization’s functions also serve as the key factors that dictate the quality of the 
working environment. In order to shape an organization in a positive manner, leaders 
must understand the primary elements of organizational culture. Sorting through this data 
can prove somewhat problematic due to the existence of many plausible theories related 
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to the subject developed from extensive academic research over several decades (Zohar 
& Luria, 2005).  
 In many cases the ability of a strong leader to establish a set of positive 
organizational values and operating norms provides a basis for the beliefs of individual 
members of the organization. Examples can be seen of leaders establishing and 
maintaining such cultures reflected in recognition of companies as “best employers” 
coupled with positive overall business performance (Smith, 2012).  
 Krause (2008) discussed the potential for contribution of supervisors to the safety 
performance of their respective workgroups. He discussed their role as a “natural proxy” 
for senior leaders. Many supervisors do not approach safety in a positive manner because 
“their role in safety is poorly understood” (p. 1). The influence of the supervisor emerged 
in much earlier works, such as those of Fleishman, Harris, and Burtt (1955), who 
recorded a direct correlation between subordinate views of supervisory consideration and 
“the number of trips to the dispensary for treatment of injuries sustained while at work” 
(p. 63). 
 Lewin (1951) found that leadership styles directly impacted organizational 
climate. It would appear reasonable to extend the concept to safety climate as a subset of 
the overall organizational climate. Similar findings emerged in research by Dunbar 
(1975), where results implied that subordinates’ view of their leader’s interest in their 
safety and general welfare appeared to be strongly influenced by the actions of the 
supervisor. 
 A reasonable assumption can be made that the first-line supervisor would wield 
the greatest level of influence on subordinates. The supervisor spends the greatest amount 
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of time as a leader of the group and generally communicates both positive and negative 
information to the employee. The leader’s actions theoretically will have the greatest 
impact on the work environment of the average employee.  
 Understanding the concepts of leadership styles, along with an analysis of 
research on the potential effects of a leader’s approach to interactions with subordinates, 
provides valuable insight into the direct impact of leaders on the safety climate of the 
workgroup they lead. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) introduced the concepts of 
transactional and transformational leadership tendencies. Transactional leaders tend to 
lead subordinates to complete assigned tasks through a system of anticipated rewards or 
recognition, while transformational leaders guide subordinates through a more persuasive 
model based on positive relationships and common goals and objectives (Hater & Bass, 
1988).    
 Zohar (2002) explored the relevance of supervisors’ leadership tendencies to the 
safety climate and injury mediation capabilities of a workgroup. Transformational leaders 
tend to exhibit stronger leader-follower interaction which positively influences the 
perception of the leader’s concern for the wellbeing of subordinates, and in turn the 
overall safety climate of the workgroup. The common attributes of a transformational 
leader tend to send a stronger message regarding the importance of safety by reducing the 
power-distance between supervisor and subordinates. 
 Zohar (2002) continued by addressing the effects of transactional leaders on the 
safety climate of a workgroup. Transactional leaders tend to adopt a style of hard-and-fast 
rules that subordinates must follow to maintain order within the workgroup. This style of 
leadership at the group level promotes an atmosphere based on strong individual 
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relationships and promotes more feelings of nameless workers, which tends to send 
negative or mixed messages regarding the importance of worker safety.  
 Parry and Proctor-Thomson (2002) reported similar observations regarding 
perceived integrity of leaders based on style or tendencies. Transformational leaders build 
feelings of trust and ultimately cultivate a higher level of respect from their subordinates, 
which translates to integrity as a leader.  
 Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) stated that subordinates see true transformational 
leaders  as authentic and ultimately ethical. The authors further observed that many 
transactional leaders attempt to display certain behaviors related to transformational 
leaders, but without the true underpinnings of leadership. A label of “pseudo-
transformational leadership” (p.186) is applied to this phenomenon. The authors call into 
question the innate ethics of leaders engaged in the practice.   
 More recent works on leadership traits and styles, such as Lefton and Buzzotta 
(2004), provide compelling arguments against the practice of aligning individual leaders 
into restrictive categories such as transactional or transformational. The primary 
contention for using broader dimensional assessment models versus more restrictive 
categories resides in the concept that human behavior is both multi-dimensional and 
variable-dependent based upon a variety of factors. The authors advocate categorizing the 
behaviors of leaders or their leadership style based on a four-quadrant dimensional model 
that includes dominant-hostile (Autocratic), submissive-hostile (Unassertive), 
submissive-warm (Easygoing), or dominant-warm (Collaborative).   
 The case presented by Lefton and Buzzotta (2004) contended that the assessments 
of leaders should focus on individual behaviors as opposed to generalized labels such as 
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transformational or transactional. The premise set forth contends that, once a person  
(superior, peers, or subordinate) affixes a label on a co-worker, it tends to remain. 
Moreover, the tendency exists to see the behaviors or actions in a person that fit the label. 
If one looks at the underling behavior(s) of individuals in specific circumstances, it 
becomes easier to understand why they act or react in a certain way and, more 
importantly provides the opportunity to affect positive change focused on the behaviors.   
 More recent works such as presented by Heifetz (2010) proposed a concept of 
flexible or “adaptive” work. This approach is rooted in two primary assumptions. The 
first explored the erroneous assumption that the connection between leaders and 
followers is an “absolute and inherently logical structure” (p. 505).  The complexion of 
leader-follower interactions takes on a variety of forms with truly effective leaders 
transforming one-time followers into co-leaders focused on the tasks at hand. The second 
assumption addressed the variability of leadership dynamics based upon the “context of 
problems and challenges” faced at a particular point and time; in short, the most effective 
leaders “mobilize people to meet adaptive challenges” (p. 506). 
  Heifetz (2010) provided further description of the adaptive work concept, and the 
overall need for adoption of the operating principle, by identifying seven key descriptive 
elements or drivers that form the overall construct: 
 1. Many problems require solutions that reside beyond the scope of present 
 operating parameters of the organization. Modern approaches to problem  solving 
 focus on gap analysis and gap closure that require flexible solutions many times 
 exceeding the capabilities of traditional approaches. 
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 2. An effective adaptive work environment must establish a focus on continuous 
 learning. Developing an understanding that many issues existing within an 
 organization are truly people problems provides an impetus for development of  
people  skills to address such complexities. 
 3. Adaptive work requires a paradigm shift from the traditional authoritarian 
 structure of top down responsibility to a more balanced or flat “stakeholder” 
 focused model. Clearly identifying and effectively engaging the true 
 stakeholders to address a specific problem provides an opportunity to achieve 
 the most effective resolution. 
 4. To be effective, the concept of adaptive work mandates that the people 
 involved consciously evaluate the components of an issue and separate the truly 
 important elements from those that have limited impact. Developing the ability of 
 individual stakeholders as well as working groups to distinguish elements of an 
 issue based on relevance provides an improved problem-solving environment.  
 5. To achieve success, adaptive work environments must maintain a balance 
 between efficiency of task and creativity. Particularly in a business environment, 
 solving problems rapidly remains a stalwart principle based in part on the old 
 adage “time is  money.”  However, too much emphasis on speed of resolution may 
 eliminate potentially innovative solutions that in the long run may prove more 
 efficient than the proverbial quick fix. 
 6. Leaders must embrace the reality that adaptive work environments must 
 operate in a different time frame than traditional focused structures. People 
 require time to process the increased information flow that emerges within 
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 adaptive work structures, and in turn must learn to react and respond in a positive 
 collaborative manner. The added dimensions resulting from the interaction of 
 stakeholders within the adaptive environment as opposed to traditional leader-
 follower structure, while potentially more complex, also provide a richer 
 environment for innovation and problem solving. 
 7. Adaptive work, while relatively new as a formal organizational construct, fits 
 with the normal human approach to identifying and resolving problems. 
 Understanding first that a problem exists, then pursuing the gathering of facts and 
 potential resolutions, and finally implementing the selected fix is logical based on 
 human  history and cultural norms. In addition, the presence of diversity of culture 
 and values within most groups results in inevitable conflicts within an adaptive 
 work environment. However, if managed effectively, these conflicts may yield 
 more robust solutions to a variety of issues. 
The concept of adaptive work and corresponding progressive work environments 
provides a more accurate portrayal of modern leadership challenges, in addition to 
leadership behaviors that transcend more traditional views related to styles and traits 
associated with leadership practice. Understanding the basis of these evolutionary 
changes in leadership theory is critical to the basis of this study relative to the influence 
of leaders on the safety of their subordinates. The variables presented by concepts such as 
adaptive leadership open many fronts for additional research beyond the topic at hand.           
Summary 
Based upon the elements of leadership theory identified in the review of the 
literature, the ability to establish a correlation between safety climate and actual injury 
rates among employees can serve as a predictive indicator of safety performance within a 
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given workgroup. Furthering this body of research in a non-manufacturing setting will 
provide additional validation of the versatility and accuracy of safety climate as 
indicators of safety performance. 
 The literature provides substantial empirical evidence of the critical role 
supervisors’ play in implementing effective safety programs within their workgroups. 
The supervisor sets the tone of the workgroup regarding expectations for safety. While 
executive engagement and support remain a critical piece of the puzzle as well, absence 
of a safety-focused primary supervisor provides a working environment with a greater 
potential for occupational injuries.  
  The concept of safety climate emerges from the literature review as a key 
influence on the perspective that employees hold toward the relative safety of their 
workplace. The ability to measure safety climate and then correlate the findings to actual 
safety performance can provide a valuable predictive insight into the level of safety 
within a given workgroup. This study will build on the previous works mentioned by 
expanding the types of entities studied to date. The previous works focused on general 
manufacturing, steel processing, oil and gas exploration, and construction settings. By 
focusing on the university staff setting, the data collected within this study will broad 
applicability across a variety of non-manufacturing settings. 
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 The primary focus of this research centers on determining whether a significant 
correlation exists between a supervisor’s commitment to the safety of subordinates, as 
perceived by the subordinates, and the actual injury rates among those employees.    
 Data were collected to explore the possible relationship between leadership 
tendencies of the supervisors and their safety climate ratings as recorded by their 
employees, with evaluation of differentials related to demographic variables including 
gender, education level, skilled verses non-skilled positions, length of service to the 
university, or shift assignment. 
Research Questions 
Three primary research questions form the foundation of this research: 
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of 
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual 
injury/illness rates within an organization? 
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices of 
supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?  
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and 
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic 
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled 
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?   
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Methodology 
 Primary data collection will come from employee responses to a survey consisting 
of three segments. The first includes seven employee demographic questions related to 
length of overall service to the organization, length of time in current job, assigned shift, 
gender, education level, functional work area, and experience level of immediate 
supervisor. 
 Segment two consists of 20 questions, including 9 related to safety climate and 11 
related to general leadership practices.  The safety climate questions originated from 
Zohar (1980) and received refinements in Zohar and Luria (2005) and Johnson (2007). 
Permission was secured from originator for the application in this research project.  The 
balance of the 11 questions focused on measuring leadership tendencies originated in an 
employee supervisor survey developed and utilized by the Human Resources Department 
of Southern Union State Community College located in Wadley, Alabama. 
Data Collection 
 The research design consists of a paper survey distributed and collected during 
regularly scheduled employee staff meetings. A member of the Environmental Health and 
Safety staff delivered the blank survey instrument, accompanied by a copy of the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval form, to the participants. Upon completion, 
the participants inserted the forms into a sealed box to assure confidentiality. 
Sample 
 During June 2013 employees of the Department of Facilities Management at a 
regional university were asked to complete the paper form survey instrument during 
regularly scheduled monthly group meetings. The facilities management organization at 
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this university had four primary functional areas of operations: maintenance, plant 
operations, building services, and grounds.  
Description of Variables 
Independent Variables 
 The primary independent variables for this study included length of service at 
university, length of time in job assignment, shift worked, gender, level of education 
completed, assigned work group, approximate experience level of supervisor in years, 
and the number and severity of work related injuries sustained by the employee within 
the previous 12 months. 
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables for this study included the supervisor’s rating for safety 
climate (Questions 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, and 24) and general leadership practices 
(Questions 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, and 27) as rated by their subordinates. 
Reliability and Validity 
 While many views exist regarding what accounts for validity in a research 
instrument, the common ground focuses on the ability of the participants to clearly 
understand the questions asked and interpret them in the intended context (Kimberlin & 
Winterstein, 2008).  
Safety Climate Questions 
 The questions related to safety climate have evolved and received repeated 
validation over a span exceeding 30 years (Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Johnson, 
2007).  Zohar and Luria (2005) produced two 16-question instruments, one focused on 
the organization in totality and the second focused on a more micro or workgroup level 
within the organization.  
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The researchers mapped the survey questions to three dimensions that appeared similar to 
findings of Brown and Holmes (1986) utilizing a 10-item survey to identify the 
dimensions of risk perception, management concern, and management action. 
 Johnson (2007) utilized the 16 questions from Zohar and Luria (2005) as the basis 
for additional research regarding the predictive validity of safety climate. While the 
results validated three similar dimensions as reported by Brown and Holmes (1986), the 
Johnson study took a broader view and identified the dimensions in a more 
straightforward manner: caring, compliance, and coaching. In addition, the study also 
noted issues of cross loading within the 16-item instrument. Using exploratory factor 
analysis (Varimax Rotation), Johnson (2007) suggested the elimination of five questions 
(A\B\E\I, and P) that yielded a factor loading of less than 0.60, resulting in an 11-item 
safety climate survey.  
 The results reported by Johnson (2007) substantiated the previous works of  Zohar 
(1980), Brown and Holmes (1986) and Zohar and Luria (2005) indicating that, while 
findings point to three distinct dimensions, a strong inner correlation exists between the 
constructs as demonstrated by a minimum score of 0.93 (p < 0.05). Based on this 
evidence, Johnson (2007) advocated the concept of a single global factor that best defines 
and provides an opportunity to measure safety climate. Based on the overall results of 
these previous studies, the safety climate questionnaire is deemed valid for the purposes 
of this research. 
Leadership Practices Questions  
 The questions related to general leadership practices have received extensive 
usage by the developing institution over a five-year period as a method to measure 
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employee perceptions of their immediate supervisor. Prior to their inclusion in this 
research instrument, the questions received extensive review for clarity of meaning and 
applicability of application for this study. The questions displayed strong face validity, as 
described in Litwin (1995). 
 Based upon the prior use but limited evidence of formal validation, the internal 
consistency of the leadership practice questions was measured utilizing Cronbach’s 
alpha. A standardized alpha score of 0.93 indicated very strong internal consistency 
across the nine leadership questions.       
Study Limitations 
 The study will address one functional staff department at a single regional 
comprehensive university. The selection of a staff department as opposed to an academic 
college helped to make the findings of the study more applicable to other non-
manufacturing settings with similar staff support functions. 
 The findings may have limits due to a potential lack of geographic, cultural, 
ethnic, and/or gender diversity that may exist within the organization sampled.  
Summary 
 The norms of leadership relative to the safety of subordinates have evolved in the 
United States and around the world in developed countries over the last century. This 
study will help clarify the critical importance of the first-line supervisor actively leading 
safety initiatives as an essential element of efforts in reducing injuries in the workplace. 
 The ability to measure a supervisor’s actual performance relative to demonstrated 
practices in leading safety, as viewed by subordinates, provides the most promise for 
establishing a correlation between the actions of a supervisor and actual injuries among 
subordinates.  
40 
 
 The statistical results of this study, along with narrative, are found in Chapter IV. 
The potential implications and application of the findings appear in Chapter V. 
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Chapter IV: RESULTS 
Introduction 
 This study focuses on determining whether a correlative relationship exists 
between the employee’s perception of supervisors commitment to safety (safety climate) 
within an organization and the rate of occurrence of occupational injuries among the 
members of the organization. A secondary aim of the study includes an evaluation of the 
relationship between the safety climate of the organization and the employees’ view of 
their supervisors’ general leadership practices. The final purpose of the study looked at 
the potential impact of demographic variables including gender, education level, skilled 
versus non-skilled positions, time in position, and shift assignment on safety climate and 
/or general leadership practices.   
    The research project received approval from the WKU Office of Research 
Integrity prior to the commencement of the study. A copy of the instrument and 
accompanying “Informed Consent for Study Participants” is included in the appendices 
section.  Detail regarding the validity and reliability of the survey instrument were 
provided in Chapter III.  
 The survey questions aimed at measuring safety climate and general leadership 
practices were structured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1= never through 7 = 
always. Questions regarding length of service and number of injuries required 
participants to insert an appropriate numerical response. Questions aimed at other 
demographic elements including assigned work shift, gender, education level achieved, 
and departmental assignment were developed using a multiple choice format. 
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Population 
 Members of the university Department of Facilities Management were asked to 
voluntarily complete the survey during regularly scheduled group meetings. The 
participants represented four functional areas within the overall facilities organization: 
Maintenance, Plant Operations, Building Services Attendants, and Grounds Crew. A total 
of 252 employees completed the survey instrument. Based on a total population of 309 
within the Department of Facilities Management, a study participation rate of 81% was 
achieved. All submitted surveys were included in the analysis.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 As shown in Table 1, the variable of assigned work shift was divided into two 
categories, day shift and night shift. Day shift was defined as those employees beginning 
work at or after 6:00 a.m., while night shift included all employees beginning their work 
shifts after 3:00 p.m. Among the 252 respondents, 167 (66.2 %) indicated a day shift 
work assignment, 79 (31.4 %) indicated night shift, and six ( 2.4 %) provided no response 
to the question. 
 Details regarding the gender of participates are included in Table 2. Among the 
252 total participants, 135 (53.5 %) were male, while females accounted for 104 (41.2%). 
Thirteen participants (5.3 %) did not indicate a gender classification on their surveys.    
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
Assigned Work Shift  
___________________________________________ 
 
Work Shift                      N           Percent   
                    
___________________________________________ 
 
Day             167   66.2 
          
Night             79   31.4 
       
No Response         6                              2.4 
 
Total     252                          100.0 
 __________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents- Gender 
___________________________________________ 
 
Gender                         N                           Percent  
___________________________________________ 
 
Male                          135                              53.5 
 
Female                      104                              41.2  
 
No Response              13                                5.3  
 
Total                         252                            100.0 
___________________________________________ 
 
 The education level of the respondents is included in Table 3. Among the 252 
employees completing the survey, 102 (40.4%) indicated they had graduated from high 
school or completed a General Education Development (GED) Examination. One 
hundred four of the employees (41.2%) reported completing some college or technical 
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school, while 34 (13.5%) indicated they were college graduates. Thirteen individuals did 
not provide a response to the question. 
 Table 4 provides information regarding the distribution of respondents by work-
group within the university’s Department of Facilities Management. Fifty-one employees 
(20.2%) indicated they were assigned to the Maintenance Group. Plant Operations Group 
accounted for 25 employees (9.9%) while 144 (57.1%) of the participants indicated 
assignments in Building Services. Twenty-nine employees reported being members of the 
Grounds Crew, and three respondents failed to provide a response to the question. 
Table 3 
 
 Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
 Level of Education Completed 
_____________________________________________ 
 
Education Level                  N         Percent            
_____________________________________________ 
 
HS or GED                   102           40.4 
          
Some College or Tech      104          41.2 
      
College Graduate         34          13.5 
       
No Response                     12                       4.9 
 
Total                    252                   100.0 
____________________________________________ 
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Table 4 
 
 Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
Assigned Work Groups  
_________________________________________________ 
    
Work Group       N                 Percent  
_________________________________________________ 
  
Maintenance     51               20.2 
                     
Plant Operations   25                      9.9 
              
Building Services                  144                      57.1 
 
Grounds    29                      11.5 
                   
No Response                 3                        1.3 
 
Total                                      252                     100.0 
_________________________________________________ 
  
 The final demographic question included in the survey results related to the 
employee’s length of service to the university, as shown in Table 5. Seventy-seven 
individuals indicated a length of service between zero and two years, accounting for 
30.5% of the total responses. Employees having served the university from three to seven 
years accounted for 81 persons (32.1%) while 93 individuals (36.9%) indicated an overall 
length of service of eight or more years. Only one participant failed to provide data for 
the question.   
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Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents 
Length of Career at University 
_______________________________________________ 
 
Years                    N                           Percent 
_______________________________________________ 
      
1-2               77   30.5 
            
3-7             81   32.1 
        
8- Above      93   36.9 
        
No Response                     1                            00.5 
 
Total                252                       100.0         
______________________________________________ 
 
Analysis 
 This research study sought to answer three primary questions: 
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of 
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual 
injury/illness rates within an organization? 
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices of 
supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?  
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and 
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic 
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled 
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?   
 The analysis of the data will be provided aligned with the individual research 
questions. 
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Analysis Research Question One 
 The first question of this study asked, “Does a significant correlation exist 
between employee perceptions of supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of 
workers and actual injury/illness rates within an organization?”  
 Initial statistical analysis indicated strong consistency, based on a lack of variance 
in mean scores between groups, relative to their responses to the safety climate questions. 
The results also indicated a strong positive mean score for all respondents of 5.21 for the 
same safety climate questions. The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 6. 
 A Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient was computed to assess 
the relationship between the Safety Climate Score and the number of occupational 
injuries, based on three injury severity classifications, within each workgroup. No 
significant correlations were found, with the exception of one data point for the Plant 
Operations Group, injuries requiring medical attention, which resulted in a weak, yet 
significant correlation based on p < .05 (r = 0.43, n = 25, p = 0.03). Results for all groups 
are displayed in Table 7. 
 Based on the findings as presented, the null hypotheses relative to Research 
Question One is not rejected. The survey data does not indicate a substantial correlation 
between the safety climate and injury experience within these workgroups. 
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Table 6 
Safety Climate Score and Employee Injuries by Workgroup 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
              Safety Climate          Minor Injuries           Injuries Requiring    Injuries with 
                                  Score                                             Medical Treatment   Lost Work Days 
                            ______________          _______________       _________________      ____________ 
  
Workgroup        N     𝑋     SD          N      𝑋      SD             N      𝑋      SD            N       𝑋     SD 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Maintenance   51  5.39   0.94        48   0.41  1.56           48   0.06   0.24          48   0.06   0.24 
 
Plant       25  5.37   1.09        25   0.20  0.50           25   0.04   0.20 25   0.00   0.00 
Operations 
 
Building          144  5.19   1.33      136   0.27  0.68  136   0.09   0.35         136    0.09  0.34 
Services  
 
Grounds            29  5.00   1.28        29   0.68  2.03    29   0.13   0.35          29    0.06   0.25 
  
No Response    3                           14             14                         14 
 
Total            252                  238               238                            238 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 7 
Correlation Between Safety Climate Score and Employee Injuries by Work Group 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Minor  Injuries           Injuries  Requiring          Injuries with 
                                                 ____________           Medical Treatment       Lost Work Days 
                                        
Workgroup                    N            r                                     r                                  r              
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Maintenance            48                  0.23                                0.19                             0.19                      
 
Plant Operations        25                  0.19                                0.43 *                          0.00 
              
Building Services       136                  0.01                                0.00                             0.00        
  
Grounds          29                  0.00                                0.12                             0.16        
  
No Response           14 
 
Total             252 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Significant  p <.05 
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 In addition to the survey data collected specifically for this study, relevant data 
exists for the university as a whole regarding both injuries requiring medical treatment 
(Total Recordable Cases) and injuries resulting in days away from work (Lost Workday 
Cases). The collection of this data is a legal requirement under the provisions of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The methods for collecting and reporting the data 
are established by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 A comparison of annual rates of significant injuries between the university being 
studied and rates for universities as reported by the Bureau of labor Statistics was 
performed. The rates for the university were calculated using a formula adopted by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for normalizing injury rate reporting:   
Number of injuries and illnesses X 200,000 / Employee hours worked = Incidence rate   
The 200,000 hours in the formula represents the equivalent of 100 employees working 40 
hours per week, 50 weeks per year, and provides a standard approach for the incidence 
rates (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). 
 The injury rates for the university being studied were for calendar year 2012. The 
employees at the university reported a total of 47 occupational injuries that met the 
criteria for inclusion on the U.S. Department of Labor Summary of Work-Related 
Injuries and Illnesses, also referred to as Recordable Cases. Included in the 47 total cases 
were 13 that resulted in employees missing at least one day of work, otherwise referred to 
as Lost Workday Cases (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). 
 Utilizing the prescribed formula, the 2012 annual recordable case rate for the 
university being studied was calculated at 1.7 cases per 100,000 hours worked: 
47 cases x200,000 = 9,400,000 /5,434,010 hours worked=1.72 Total Recordable Rate.  
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Using the same formula, the lost workday case rate was calculated: 
13 cases x 200,000 = 2,600,000 / 5,434,010 hours worked = 0.47 Lost Workday Rate 
 The comparative numbers originated from the Bureau of Labor Statistics report, 
Incident Rates of Non-Fatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry and Case 
Types- 2011. The 2011 calendar year data is the most current comparative data available 
at the time of this study. The BLS reported corresponding injury rate data for the 
education and health services sectors in general at 4.7 total recordable cases per 100,000 
hours worked, and 1.3 lost workday cases per 100,000 hours worked. The BLS further 
reported rates specifically for colleges, universities, and professional schools at 2.1 total 
recordable case rate and .6 lost workday case rate.  
 The findings displayed in Table 8 provide evidence that supports the concept 
outlined in Research Question One. The annual total recordable injury rates for the 
university studied were 19% lower than the national average for a similar period of time. 
The lost workday case rate for the same periods of comparison were 21.6 % lower. The 
safety climate score for the representative sample of employees collected during the study 
is 5.27. Based on the 7-point Likert scale used in the study, the median score for safety 
climate is 3.50. Therefore, the safety climate for the university studied should be viewed 
as substantially positive.  
 The individual group data collected as part of the survey process did not yield any 
substantial correlations between the group safety climate scores and their injury 
experience. However, applying the university-wide normalized data to a validated 
national database focused on colleges and universities yielded findings supportive of the 
concept that a positive safety climate will yield fewer injuries among the employees. 
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Table 8 
 
Subject University Injury Rates Compared with Bureau of Labor Statistics Injury Data 
For U.S. Universities 
 
                 Subject University *         BLS Data **           Differential 
 
 
Total Recordable Case Rate  1.7   2.1         19.0 % 
 
Lost Workday Case Rate                0.47                             0.60         21.6 % 
________________________________________________________________________
*Subject University Data for Calendar Year 2012 
** Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Injury Data for Calendar Year 2011 
   
Analysis Research Question Two 
 The second research question asked, “Does a significant correlation exist between 
specific leadership practices of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived 
by their employees?” 
 Initial statistical analysis indicated strong consistency between groups based on 
the lack of variance in mean scores by group relative to their responses to the leadership 
practice questions. The results also indicated a strong positive mean score for all 
respondents of 5.62 for the same leadership questions. The results of the analysis are 
displayed in Table 9. 
 A Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient was computed to assess 
the relationship between the Safety Climate Score and the results of Leadership Practices 
Questions, by workgroup. The results ranged from 0.81 for the Grounds Group to 0.85 
for the Plant Operations Group, indicating a strong positive correlation. The results for all 
groups are included in Table 10. 
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Table 9 
Leadership Practice Scores by Workgroup 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Department       N                          𝑋    SD 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Maintenance     51                  5.74  0.92                     
Plant Operations   25                        5.84  1.04            
Building Services                  144                        5.56                      1.32              
Grounds    29                        5.62  0.98                  
No Response                 3 
Total                                      252 
____________________________________________________________  
 
Table 10 
 
Safety Climate Scores Compared with Leadership Practice Scores by Workgroup 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
    
       Safety Climate             Leadership Practices 
 
Work Group    N          𝑋  SD   N   𝑋       SD      Correlation 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Maintenance    51  5.29 0.94            51 5.74 0.92             0.84*    
 
Plant Operations  25        5.37 1.09            25 5.84 1.04             0.85*  
 
Building Services      144        5.19 1.33           144 5.56     1.32                 0.84*  
 
Grounds   29       5.00 1.28             29   5.62 0.98             0.81*  
 
No Response                  3      3 
 
Total             252             252 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
*Significant  p <.05 
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 Based on the findings of as presented, the null hypotheses relative to Research 
Question Two is rejected. The survey data indicates a strong correlation between the 
Safety Climate Scores and the results of the Leadership Practices questions across all four 
groups. 
Analysis Research Question Three 
 The third research question asked, “Is there a significant difference in employee 
views on safety climate and leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee 
demographic variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled 
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?”  
 An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to compare each of the 
demographic variables of gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled positions, 
time in position, and shift assignment with both the safety climate and leadership 
practices scores. 
 Relative to gender, males accounted for 135 (54%) of the participants while 104 
(41%) reported as female. Thirteen participants or (5%) failed to indicate gender on their 
surveys. The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance between the two 
genders when compared to either the safety climate or leadership practice scores. The 
results did not indicate any instances at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the 
null hypothesis for the gender element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected. 
The data related to the gender variable is displayed in Table 11.    
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Table 11 
 
Safety Climate and Leadership Practice Scores by Gender 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
       Safety Climate               Leadership Practices 
 
Gender                          N    𝑋       SD  N            𝑋        SD 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Male        135  5.27  1.10           135 5.66  1.10 
      
Female   104  5.04  1.32           104 5.48  1.28 
 
No Response     13    13 
 
Total   252             252 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 Data concerning the level of education of participants indicated that 102 (40%) of 
the participants reported being high school graduates or having successfully completed 
the General Education Development Test (GED), 104 (41%) reported having completed 
some amount of college or technical school training, 34 (13%) reported being college 
graduates, and 12 failed to indicate a level of education completed on their surveys.  
 The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of 
participants in each of the levels of education. The results did not indicate any instances 
at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis for the education level 
element of research question three cannot be rejected. The data related to the education 
level variable is displayed in Table 12. 
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Table 12 
 Safety Climate and Leadership Practices Scores by Level of Education 
__________________________________________________________________ 
     
       Safety Climate         Leadership Practices 
 
Education Level                      N  𝑋         SD      N     𝑋         SD 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
HS or GED                 102 5.42 1.10      102    5.72    1.16  
 
Some College or Tech          104 5.16 1.18    104     5.59    1.20  
 
College Graduate             34 4.91 1.44          34   5.54    1.26 
 
No Response               12       12 
 
Total             252      252 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
 To analyze the potential impacts of the positions held by participants on their 
view of their supervisors’ performance, data were assembled based on the workgroup 
assignments.  Participants within the Maintenance and Plant Operations groups were 
classified as having skilled positions; these individuals have technical training and/or 
professional certifications in a recognized craft or trade such as electricians or Heating, 
Ventilation and Air Conditioning Technicians (HVAC). The participants in the Building 
Services and Grounds groups were considered to have non-skilled positions. The normal 
assignments for these groups include general cleaning, lawn care, etc. Participants 
occupying skilled positions accounted for 76 (30%) of the respondents, while 173 (69%) 
were aligned to non-skilled. Three participants (1%) failed to indicate a workgroup 
assignment.    
 The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of 
participants between those assigned to skilled or non-skilled positions. The results did not 
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indicate any instances at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis 
for position skill level element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected. The data 
related to the position skill level variable is displayed in Table 13.    
Table 13 
 
Safety Climate and Leadership Practice Scores  
by Workers in Skilled vs. Non-Skilled Positions 
____________________________________________________ 
 
Department                    N         𝑋                    SD       
____________________________________________________ 
 
Maintenance *     51  5.29  0.94 
 
Plant Operations *     25             5.37  1.09          
 
Building Services **   144              5.19  1.33         
 
Grounds **      29            5.00  1.28           
 
No Response                      3 
 
Total               252 
____________________________________________________ 
* Skilled Positions 
** Non-Skilled Positions 
 
Data related to the years of service of participants at the university indicated that 
77 (30%) of the participants reported a length of service between zero and two years, 81 
(32%) reported having between three and seven years, and 93 (37%) reported having 
eight or more years of service. Only one participant failed to respond to the length of 
service question. 
 The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of 
participants based upon their length of service to the university. The results did not 
indicate any instances at the p < .05 level.  Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis 
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for length of service element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected. The data 
related to the length of service variable is displayed in Table 14.    
 
Table 14 
 
Safety Climate and Leadership Practices Scores by Years of Service 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
                
      Safety Climate          Leadership Practices 
               
Years of Service         N  𝑋   SD    N       𝑋    SD      
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1-2                 77       5.62 1.20    77 5.27  1.15                        
  
3-7                81       5.53 1.09    81 5.15  1.19 
               
8- Above             93       5.71 1.26                 93 5.22      1.32                          
 
No Response                 1      1 
 
Total            252              252 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
    
 Data were collected to assess the influence of assigned work shift on employees’ 
views of their supervisor related to safety climate and leadership practices.  Responses 
from participants indicated that 167 (67%) reported a day shift assignment, while 79 
(31%) reported assignments on night shift. Two participants failed to respond to the shift 
assignment question. 
 The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of 
participants based upon their assigned work shift. The results did not indicate any 
instances at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis for the shift 
assignment element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected. The data related to 
the shift assignment variable is displayed in Table 15.    
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Table 15 
 
Safety Climate and Leadership Practice Scores by Assigned Work Shift  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
      Safety Climate     Leadership Practices            
 
Shift                            N         𝑋       SD   N       𝑋          SD 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Day            167 5.29    1.15  167   5.72   1.12 
      
Night                79 5.05    1.27    79 5.43   1.19 
  
No Response          6        6 
 
Total   252    252 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
Summary 
 A comprehensive review of literature regarding the potential impact of leaders on 
the safety of their subordinates yielded a variety of research spanning well over 30 years. 
Beginning with Zohar (1980), the concept of safety climate emerged and has served as a 
focal point of a number of key studies. The studies to date have focused on general 
manufacturing, oil exploration, and heavy industry settings. The need to understand the 
potential for transferability of findings to non-manufacturing settings, such as a 
university, served as the primary driver for this research. 
 The study focused on maintenance and housekeeping personnel at a regional 
comprehensive university during the summer of 2013. A potential participant pool of 300 
employees was identified, and ultimately 252 (84%) completed surveys for the study. 
A combination of analysis tools, including Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation 
Coefficient and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), was used to assess the data surrounding 
the proposed research questions.  The results were presented in this chapter. Chapter V 
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will provide additional perspective regarding the findings, along with potential 
applications and possibilities for future research.   
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CHAPTER V :  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
 Occupational injuries have dramatic impacts, both direct and indirect, on not only 
the worker that sustains the injury, but also the worker’s family, co-workers, supervisors, 
and many others dependent upon the particular circumstances of the causal event. With 
the creation of the National Safety Council and other organizations focused on the study 
of injuries and method of injury prevention, countless studies have yielded a litany of 
theories regarding the causes of these injuries and methods to protect human beings from 
them.  
 Debates have continued throughout the history of the industrialized world 
regarding who holds the responsibility for the safety of a worker. Early practice focused 
squarely and solely on the injured worker and/or a co-worker who may have contributed 
to the event. With the growth of trade unions and collective bargaining, followed by the 
passage of the OSHA Act, employers became the primary holder of responsibility for the 
safety of their workers. Requirements to identify and control common risks, provide 
personal protective equipment, and train employees regarding the potential hazards they 
face in performing their assigned tasks have resulted in a higher level of overall worker 
safety in all sectors. 
 Despite the overall improvements in knowledge, processes, technology, and 
training, workers still suffer injuries, including over 4600 fatal injuries in the U.S. in 
2011 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). The review of literature discussed several of the 
current initiatives aimed at positively influencing behaviors by engaging workers and 
supervisors more actively in injury prevention. All of the behavior related concepts 
appear to have one common theme, the need for strong “safety focused” leadership. The 
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most successful corporate-wide safety transformations studied, including Alcoa, DuPont, 
and General Motors, all began with a strong focus on developing safety savvy leaders at 
all levels. 
 The concept of measuring safety climate, first reported by Zohar (1980) is based 
on worker responses to a series of questions aimed at gauging how workers feel their 
supervisor responds to certain situations that potentially impact their safety. In the years 
since, the original safety climate survey process received refinements based upon 
statistical evaluations made following studies in a variety of settings across the globe. 
 The primary focus of this study centered on determining whether the safety 
climate score of a workgroup correlates to the number of injuries and illnesses sustained 
by the employees within the workgroup. A number of previous studies have established 
relationships between the stated variables to varying degrees, and across a variety of 
settings including oil and gas exploration, construction, and general manufacturing. The 
construct of the study follows the basic path of the previous endeavors; however the 
application in a university setting appears seminal.  
 This research strived to add to the body of knowledge regarding organizational 
leadership influence on employee safety. In order to develop effective interventional 
strategies for injury reduction, a greater understanding of the dynamics between 
employees and supervisors relative to matters of safety is essential. This research aids in 
understanding the potential impact of demographic variables such as gender, education 
level, skilled versus non-skilled positions, time in position, and shift assignment on 
employee views regarding safety climate within their workgroup. 
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Three primary research questions form the foundation of this study: 
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of 
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual 
injury/illness rates within an organization? 
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices of 
supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?  
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and 
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic 
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled 
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?   
Discussion of Research Findings 
 Findings for the specific research questions along with additional findings and 
observations related to the study are included in this section. 
Research Question One 
 Research Question One asked, “Does a significant correlation exist between 
employee perceptions of his supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers 
and actual injury/illness rates within an organization?”  A Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation Coefficient was conducted to assess the statistical relationship between the 
safety climate score of participants drawn from survey Questions 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 
20, 22, and 24 and the number of injuries that participants suffered within the last 12-
month period. 
 With the exception of one workgroup, Plant Operations, no significant 
correlations emerged relative to research question one. In addition, the correlation found 
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in the Plant Operations Group data while meeting the threshold for significance (p < .05) 
appeared weak with a level of (p = 0.03).  The overall lack of statistical significance may 
be a function of sample size as divided within the four workgroups. A larger sample size 
may be required to yield a statistically significant finding.  
 While the null hypothesis for Research Question One was rejected based upon the 
survey data, a comparison of secondary data gathered across the subject university as a 
whole, with national injury data (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012), revealed a positive 
relationship between a positive safety climate score for all respondents of 5.21 based on a 
7- point Likert scale. The university data for all employees for the calendar year 2012 
indicated a Total OSHA Recordable Case Rate of 1.7 cases per 100,000 hours worked 
compared to a national average for universities of 2.1 reflected in the most recent data 
available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Data for calendar year 2011. The comparison 
revealed that the subject university rate was 19.0% lower than the national average. The 
data indicated a similar story for Lost Workday Case Rates, with the subject university 
displaying an annual rate of 0.47 cases per 100,000 hours worked versus a national 
average of 0.60, a 21.6% lower rate of injuries. 
 The individual group data collected as part of the survey process did not yield any 
substantial correlations between the group safety climate scores and their injury 
experience. However, applying the university-wide normalized data to a validated 
national database focused on colleges and universities yielded findings supportive of the 
concept that a positive safety climate will yield fewer injuries among the employees.  
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Research Question Two 
 Research Question Two asked, “Does a significant correlation exist between 
specific leadership practices of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived 
by their employees?”  Initial statistical analysis indicated strong consistency between 
groups based on the lack of variance in mean scores by group relative to their responses 
to the leadership practice questions. The results also indicated a strong positive mean 
score for all respondents of 5.62 for the same leadership questions. A Pearson Product-
Moment Correlation Coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the 
Safety Climate Score and the results of Leadership Practices Questions by workgroup. 
The results ranged from 0.81 for the Grounds Group to 0.85 for the Plant Operations 
Group, indicating a strong positive correlation.  
 The purpose in including this question was to validate the premise that leader 
actions transcend the operational climate of the workgroup. The findings indicate that, 
among the groups included in this study, the leaders displayed a consistency of actions 
both in areas of general leadership practices and more specifically actions that potentially 
impacted the safety of their subordinates.  
Research Question Three 
 Research Question Three asked, “Is there a significant difference in employee 
views on safety climate and leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee 
demographic variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled 
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?”  An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed to compare each of the demographic variables. The findings across the five 
demographic variables failed to yield any instances where the value of p < .05, therefore 
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no significant differences existed relative to gender, education level, skilled versus non-
skilled positions, time in position, or shift assignment. 
This lack of variance between demographic groups should serve as a positive indicator of   
a consistency of leadership among the supervisors of the participants within this research.   
Additional Findings  
 While not specifically germane to the prescribed research questions, an interesting 
variance emerged regarding responses to two of the safety climate questions. The median 
rating for all survey questions by all respondents was 5.40 on a 7- point Likert scale. The 
two questions referenced numbers 14 and 27 were the only questions with ratings below 
5.0.   Question 14 -- “Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule” 
had a median rating of 4.33 while question 27 -- “Frequently talks about safety issues 
throughout the work week” -- had a median score of 4.87. The ultimate meaning of the 
rating divergence specifically regarding these questions lies beyond the realm of this 
study. The presence of this anomaly within the data may provide a window for a more 
focused future inquiry.   
Study Limitations 
 The study addressed a relatively small sample of employees from one functional 
staff department at a single regional comprehensive university. The findings may have 
limits due to a potential lack of geographic, cultural, and ethnic diversity that may exist 
within the organization sampled. Additional studies should be considered to provide a 
broader view of the subject in other similar settings. 
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Suggestions for Future Research 
 The pursuit of knowledge that may prevent someone from suffering an 
occupational injury is a valuable endeavor. Developing a deeper understanding of the 
dynamics of leadership, as it relates to fostering a positive safety climate at the 
workgroup level, may ultimately lead to opportunities for enhancements in leadership 
selection and development processes. Additional studies could be conducted among 
similar populations at other universities, healthcare facilities, and non-profit 
organizations that would continue to build on the overall body of safety climate research.  
 Additional inquiry may be warranted within the target population of this study to 
explore the divergent data related to survey questions 14 and 27. A more granular 
exploration into the subtopics included in these questions may lead to development of 
strategies for improvement of local leadership practices. 
 Leading safety in the workplace is a pivotal topic that warrants additional inquiry. 
There exist several levels of focus on the topic beyond the first-line supervisor; these 
include actions of mid-level and senior leaders, in addition to enablers and catalysts 
including education and training for leaders at all levels. Establishing “need to know” 
attitudes towards safety related topics within organizations must start at the top. The 
organizational importance of specific initiatives and practices begins with the tone and 
direction set by leaders. Instilling a sense of importance regarding the safety of workers, 
into the psyche of leaders remains a dilemma. Exploring the current state of leadership 
development may provide valuable insight on where to begin. 
 Dunlap (2009) discussed the lack of safety content in leader education, 
specifically in Masters of Business Administration (MBA) programs. A review of MBA 
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curriculums, coupled with interviews of MBA candidates, provided evidence that formal 
course content focused on safety leadership is non-existent. During interviews with 
leaders in business settings that had recently completed an MBA, Dunlap found that 
while all participants viewed safety as important, and a key responsibility for them as 
leaders, none indicated that they had received formal training on the subject area. 
 Behm, Veltri, Fonooni, and Haynes (2008) surveyed the Deans of 50 business 
school across the United States to determine if their programs included environmental 
health and safety (EH&S) content as either required or elective courses. They further 
asked the deans to provide personal insight into their perspectives regarding the 
importance of EH&S knowledge for business leaders. With regard to curriculum, no 
health and safety related courses were included as either required or elective in any of the 
programs, while five schools listed elective courses in environmental related topics.  
 The study by Behm et al. (2008) also solicited feedback from the business school 
deans regarding their personal views on the importance of EH&S to today’s business 
leaders. Of the deans that provided comments: 
 Most thought that safety was an operational issue while environmental   
 management was more strategic, and thus more important for their students  
 to understand.  Respondents also referred to the importance of green issues  
 and sustainability, and the fact that environmental issues are public whereas  
 safety is an internal issue, suggesting that public issues are more important  
 than internal issues to the workforce. 
 Based upon the findings of Dunlap (2009) and Behm et al. (2008), there appears 
to be a need for inclusion of EH&S related topics, focused on key leadership practices, in 
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established avenues of leader development such as general management degree and/or 
MBA programs. Establishing a strong case for the inclusion of core safety courses within 
the curriculum of existing business degree programs may provide a platform for changing 
the paradigm of leaders with regard to their role in protecting workers.  
 Additional research should be considered to assist in strengthening the case for 
inclusion of EH&S within business curriculums. A comparative survey that solicited the 
view of individual leaders relative to their focus and involvement in leading safety 
initiatives within their organizations may provide a valuable base on which to build a 
compelling case for change. Establishing a correlation between the active support of 
safety initiatives among leaders, and reduced injury rates within their organizations 
would provide an opportunity to assign an estimated dollar savings associated with the 
positive leadership practices. While some may view the attribution of monetary 
implications to the topic of employee injuries as abhorrent, the exercise may provide a 
common rally point for the divergent philosophies that span the world of business 
academics.      
 Enlisting key faculty from leading business schools to jointly participate in safety 
leadership research may also hold promise for escalating interest in the topic area. The 
potential leverage that accompanies the endorsement of theories and practices by 
established academics’ within renowned universities can greatly accelerate the 
recognition and acceptance of concepts such as active safety leadership across the world 
of business.    
 Establishing practical correlations between the implementation of positive safety 
initiatives with established business practices such as quality, waste reduction, and 
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sustainability may provide yet another avenue. Taubitz (2010) discussed avenues that 
safety professionals can and should utilize to become “part of the discussion” around lean 
and sustainable initiatives. Taubitz illustrates that “natural” partnership opportunities 
exist to inject EH&S principles into the “fabric” of sustainable initiatives.    
 La Duke (2011) makes a case for the application of Deming’s principles of 
elimination of waste and adoption of new operating philosophies around safety within 
organizations. Injuries and the resulting direct and indirect effects on daily activities 
within an organization constitute waste. Preventing injuries constitutes a proactive form 
of waste elimination, a practice core to Deming’s principles. The principle of adopting 
new operating philosophies supports the premises espoused by La Duke (2011) and 
Taubitz (2010). Leaders must be motivated to think not only “outside the box” but also in 
terms of actively championing EH&S practices in their daily operational practices. 
 Establishing partnerships between business leaders, academia, and safety 
professionals to collectively undertake a series of research initiatives aimed at 
establishing a substantive body of data to support the need for leadership engagement in 
safety, appears to hold the most promise for gaining acceptance of safety leadership 
concepts.   
Conclusions 
 The documented research into the specific topic of safety climate appears to have 
begun with a seminal study by Zohar  (1980) that sought to link the potential impact of 
organizational leaders actions on the overall view and actions of their employees toward 
safety. While the initial study did not yield findings that supported a significant 
correlation between supervisor’s actions and the relative safety of employees, it provided 
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clear indicators that the concept of safety climate was both real and warranted further 
study.  
 Following Zohar’s initial research in 1980 through 2003, some 29 studies were 
undertaken around the globe focused on exploring the concept of safety culture and/or 
climate in a broad array of industrial settings. While the structure and findings of the 
studies presented considerable variability, commonality was found in on the fact that 
leaders’ actions provided the greatest impact either positive or negative on the overall 
operational climate of the workgroups and, specifically, on the area of safety (Yule, 
2003).   
 The findings of this study, while in several instances not yielding statistically 
significant data, support several key assertions that appear to have relevancy in the study 
and practice of the critical importance of leadership in providing a safe workplace. The 
overall responses of the study participants in both safety climate and general leadership 
actions indicated strong consistency, and also substantially positive overall scores. These 
positive survey scores coupled with the subject university data that indicates an injury 
experience some 20 % less than the average for U.S. universities, provides a persuasive 
argument for the overall construct of the study.  
 It stands to reason that the immediate supervisor would have the greatest 
influence on their employees due to the high level of daily contact and the basic nature of 
the leader-employee relationship. Flin (2003) supported the notion that while all levels of 
leadership within an organization have influence on policies and actions that, directly 
impact the safety of employees, generally speaking the lower level employees face the 
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greatest risk for injury. Therefore, their immediate supervisors have the greatest potential 
for influence within their span of control.   
 Going forward, much additional research is needed on this subject of safety 
climate. A compelling case exists based upon the number of occupational fatalities and 
serious injuries that occur each day in this country. The opportunities to better understand 
the relationship and dynamics that exist between supervisors and the employees they 
manage, particularly in the area of safety climate, appear abundant. While complex, the 
concepts of organizational culture and climate become a bit clearer with each additional 
piece of research completed.     
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continue throughout the project via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal regulations 
require  each participant  receive a copy of the consent document. 
 
Please note that any revision to previously  approved materials must be approved by this office prior to initiation. 
Please use  the appropriate revision forms for this procedure. 
 
All UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS  involving risks to subjects or others and SERIOUS  and UNEXPECTED 
adverse events must be reported promptly to this office. Please use  the appropriate reporting  forms for this 
procedure. All FDA and sponsor reporting  requirements should  also be followed. 
 
All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported promptly to this office. 
 
This project has  been determined to be a Minimal Risk project. 
 
Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of three  years after the completion of the project. 
If you have  any questions, please contact Paul Mooney at (270) 745-2129 or irb@wku.edu. Please include your 
project title and reference number in all correspondence with this committee. 
 
This letter has  been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within Western 
Kentucky University (WKU) IRB's records. 
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WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY 
Institutional Review Board 
Continuing Review Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Project:  A Comparative Analysis of the Relationship Between Employee Perceptions of Their 
Supervisor's Commitment to Safety and Actual Injury Rates in a University Setting 
Name of Researcher: David E. Oliver MS, CSP, CEM 
Department: WKU Ed Leadership doctoral Program 
 
How many total subjects have participated in the study since its inception?  # 0 
 
How many subjects have participated in the project since the last review? # 0 
 
Is your data collection with human subjects complete? Yes No 
 
1. Has there been any change in the level of risks to human subjects? 
(If “Yes”, please explain changes on a separate sheet). Yes No 
 
2. Have informed consent procedures changed so as to put subjects 
above minimal risk? (If “Yes”, please describe on a separate sheet). Yes No 
 
3. Have any subjects withdrawn from the research due to adverse 
events or any unanticipated risks/problems? (If “Yes”, please describe 
on a separate sheet). Yes No 
 
4. Have there been any changes to the source(s) of subjects and the 
Selection criteria? (If “Yes”, please describe on a separate sheet). Yes No 
 
5. Have there been any changes to your research design that were not 
specified in your application, including the frequency, duration and 
location of each procedure.  (If “Yes”, please describe on a 
separate sheet). Survey Instrument Attached with Highlighted Changes Yes No 
 
6. Has there been any change to the way in which confidentiality of the 
Data is maintained? (If “Yes”, please describe on a separate sheet). Yes No 
 
7. Is there desire to extend the time line of the project? Yes No 
 
On what date do you anticipate data collection with human subjects to be completed?     
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INFORMED CONSENT FOR STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
 
Project Title: Department of Facilities Management - Employee Safety Perception Study 
 
Investigator: David E. Oliver CSP, CEM, 270-745-4181 
 
You are being asked to participate in a project conducted through Western Kentucky University. The University 
requires that you acknowledge your agreement to participate in this project. The investigator or his delegate will 
explain to you in detail the purpose of the project, the procedures to be used, and the potential benefits and possible 
risks of participation. You may ask him/her any questions you have to help you understand the project. A basic 
explanation of the project is written below. Please read this explanation and discuss with the researcher or his 
delegate any questions you may have. 
 
1. Nature and Purpose of the Project: Doctoral dissertation research to determine if employee’s 
perception of their supervisor’s commitment to safety is reflected in the actual number of injuries that 
occur on in the workplace. 
 
2. Explanation of Procedures: By completing this survey, the information you provide will be analyzed 
and compared to the number of injuries that have occurred within the group over the last twelve 
months. The findings will provide critical information regarding a possible correlation between safety 
climate and the frequency of injuries. 
 
3. Discomfort and Risks: There are no known discomforts or risks that are likely to result from this 
research. 
 
4. Benefits: The University may derive benefits from a better understanding of how the actions of 
supervisors can impact the relative safety of the workplace. This information may lead to improved 
safety procedures and training for all levels of the university. 
 
5. Confidentiality: At no point will participants be asked to include their name or other identifying 
information as part of this project. Upon completing the survey you will be asked to place it in a sealed 
box, that will only be opened when all surveys have been completed. Survey forms will be retained in 
a secure location on campus for the required time period of three years, after that period all related 
materials will be disposed of in accordance with university policy for disposal of confidential 
materials. 
 
6. Refusal/Withdrawal: Participation in this research project is entirely voluntary. There are no 
penalties for choosing not to participate, and anyone who agrees to participate in this study is free to 
withdraw from the study at any time with no penalty. 
 
After reviewing the elements of the project, if you then decide to participate, your completion of this 
survey will serve as verification of your implied consent as a voluntary participant. 
 
You understand also that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental procedure, and you 
believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both the known and potential but unknown risks. 
 
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY 
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD 
Paul Mooney, Human Protections Administrator 
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-2129 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
